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Abstract 
Human error contributes to one of the major causes of the prevalence of drinking water contamination 
incidents. It has, however, attracted insufficient attention in the cleaner production management community. 
This paper analyzes human error appearing in each stage of the gestation of 40 drinking water incidents and 
their causes, proposes resilience-based mechanisms and tools within three groups: consumers, drinking water 
companies, and policy regulators. The mechanism analysis involves concepts and ideas from behavioral 
science, organizational culture, and incentive analysis. Determinants for realizing cleaner drinking water 
system are identified. Future efforts and direction for embedding resilience into drinking water risk 
management are suggested. This paper contributes to identifying a framework and determinants of resilience-
oriented management mechanisms for cleaner drinking water supply, and, is essential for ensuring the 
successful practice of managing drinking water contamination risks. It harmonizes the two fields of risk 
management and resilience thinking, and provides a new insight for implementing effective actions in drinking 
water-related sectors. 
 




The drinking water utility is a typical sector that needs cleaner production. Providing wholesome, affordable 
and safe drinking water that has the trust of customers should be the overarching goal of the drinking water 
utility sector (AWWA et al., 2001; IWA et al., 2004). Therefore, drinking water utility sector is special in need 
of cleaner production. Interruption of water supply or deterioration of drinking water quality often leads to 
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immense negative impact on people’s daily living (Jalba et al., 2010). Risk management for safe drinking 
water is receiving increasing attention partly because drinking water disease outbreaks have been causing 
serious losses. Chang et al. (2012) pointed out that drinking water utilities are inherently vulnerable to 
contamination incidents caused by routine operations, and accordingly, proposed to develop modern concepts 
and approaches to risk management for these utilities. The experience of the past few decades has shown that 
it is not enough to merely rely on treated water compliance monitoring to ensure safe drinking water. The 
water sector is experiencing a significant shift in the approach from ad hoc approaches to one that increasingly 
manages risk explicitly and broadly (MacGillivray et al., 2007). “Process optimization, monitoring, training 
and management combined with improved governmental policies” (Klemeš et al., 2012) are critical 
contributors to clean production of drinking water. 
Many papers have pay attention to cleaner production from various perspectives; however, seldom is seen to 
consider this aspect from human error prevention perspective. Human error plays a significant role in 
contributing to drinking water contamination incidents. A thorough analysis of human error in various stages 
of drinking water contamination incidents could be beneficial in preventing further outbreaks and ensuring 
cleaner drinking water supply. Here we attempt to discover potential causes of human errors in each stage of 
the gestation of drinking water contamination incidents and explore the potential multidimensional approaches 
for coping with human errors to improve the resilience of drinking water systems. 
The term resilience serves as a right overarching concept to represent the idea of managing risks through 
prevention, reduction and mitigation. This notion includes how individuals and organizations adapt to and act 
on risks (Beermann, 2011). The Oxford English Dictionary defines resilience as the capacity of returning or 
springing back. This means in a physical sense that a system or an object can resume its initial stage or state 
after being displaced. Resilience is also defined as elasticity (Blackmore and Plant, 2008), and it has been 
referred to the art of managing unexpected, or how a team or organizations becomes prepare to cope with 




The breakout of a drinking water contamination incident may be seen as a result of accumulation of risks 
from unsafe factors in a drinking water utility sector. Heinrich (1959) put forward the famous causal chain 
theory to explain the occurrence of an accident, which could only occur in a moment but is a consequence of a 
series of causalities of various factors that had occurred. Heinrich conducted a survey on 75,000 industrial 
accidents. The survey result showed that only 2% of these accidents cannot be prevented, and the remaining 
98% can be prevented or avoid. For that 98% of all accidents, unsafe human actions accounted for the 
majority, that is, 88%, and unsafe states of materials accounted for only 10%. Furthermore, the insecurity of 
materials was largely caused by unsafe human actions. Therefore, Heinrich concluded that almost all accidents 
were caused by unsafe human actions. 
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Unsafe human actions were considered as human errors in Reason’s research (Reason, 2000). The famous 
Swiss cheese model put forward by Reason can be understood from organization management perspective. 
Organizational behavior plays a critical role in the risk evolution of an accident. Organization management 
can serve as firewalls in the risk evolution process of an accident; however, there are different degrees of 
vulnerability in organization management. The emergence of dynamic loopholes in the barriers formed by 
organization management will permit accident risks penetrating through these loopholes, especially various 
regulatory loopholes overlap in which risks of accidents are more likely to evolve rapidly into real 
emergencies. In other words, advanced organization management can serve as barriers to block risk evolution, 
while poor organization management will serve as booster to accelerate risk evolution. Understanding human 
error from organization management perspective provides significant opportunities for improving safety and 
promoting cleaner production for drinking water utility sector.  
Based on a secondary analysis of 62 drinking water incidents occurring in affluent countries between 1974 
and 2001 reported by Hrudey and Hrudey (2004), Wu et al. (2009) found that in 78% of the 62 water incidents, 
human errors were direct or indirect contributors. This finding suggested “investigation of the lifecycle of 
drinking water incidents” as one of the pertinent areas for future research. That is, understanding the 
distribution of human errors across the lifecycle of drinking water incidents might help identify opportunities 
to reduce human errors and provide a deeper insight into their gestation.  
Wu et al (2009) suggested that the gestation of a typical water incident might cover 6 periods: 
contamination, sensing, warning, recognition, inspection and recovery (Fig. 1). Analyzing human error in each 
period is helpful because the identification of common human errors may significantly contribute to the 
purposeful design of effective countermeasures. A root cause analysis may also contribute to the early 
discovery and reduction of potential hazards, and accordingly, reduce risks. 
 
Figure 1. A typical gestation for a drinking water incident (adapted from Wu et al. (2009)) 
For risk evolution of drinking water contamination incidents, resilience may be considered from two 
perspectives, that is, how to avoid the occurrence of an incident, and how to quickly and efficiently respond to 
the incident, to minimize losses and social impacts it causes. Resilience can be enhanced by both risk 
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reduction activities undertaken before an incident and response activities following the incident (McDaniels et 
al., 2008). 
Human error cannot be eradicated completely because of its unpredictability and uncertainty related with 
human behavior. However, it is possible to reduce the probability of occurrence and the adverse consequences 
when it does inevitably arise (Reason, 2000). This can be achieved by improving the process of drinking water 
risk management to “make it hard for people to do the wrong thing and easy for people to do the right thing” 
(Kohn et al, 2000), and to quickly recognize unfavorable situations within the water supply system and 
promote its return to effective performance. 
This paper completes the analysis of Wu et al (2009) through investigating 40 cases of drinking water 
contamination incidents by content analysis to identify typical human errors and their distributions in each 
period of the evolution process, proposing countermeasures to their root causes, and put forward strategies 
from organization management perspective for building resilience in the process management of risk evolution 
of drinking water contamination incidents. 
 
3. Material and methods 
 
Below, using content analysis, we reinvestigate 33 cases of drinking water incidents from Hrudey’s primary 
analysis (Hrudey et al., 2003; Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004; Hrudey et al., 2006; Hrudey and Hrudey, 2007), and 
examine further 7 cases collected from other sources (Table 1).  
Although we reviewed and scrutinized more than one hundred water incidents, only these 40 cases were 
finally chosen for analysis considering the typicality and influence of these outbreaks and incidents. Moreover, 
although some cases are influential, but there is insufficient official reports about the evolutive details of each 
stage corresponding to the typical gestation model (Wu et al., 2009), which will result in inaccuracy in 
distinguishing each stage shown in Figure 1. So we abandoned those cases without sufficient information in 
terms of the evolutive details to minimize potential author bias.  
There is no doubt that the 33 cases from Hrudey’s primary analysis are typical and known to many people in 
affluent countries. Here, we need some succinct explain about why to choose the other 7 cases. Three cases 
with no. 26, no. 28 and no. 36 came from renowned peer reviewed journal articles, which reported the 
evolutive information corresponding to Figure 1 and provide beneficial complementarities for the 33 cases 
from Hrudey’s primary analysis, therefore, they are suitable to be adopted into this analysis. The other four 
cases with no. 37, no. 38, no. 39 and no. 40 came from peer reviewed journal articles and the most 
authoritative news agency of China. The four cases are all influential water incidents in China. Since China is 
the biggest developing country in the world and can be seen as a representative and pioneer of developing 
countries, therefore, the four cases are undoubtedly typical and have the merit to be taken into this analysis.  
We categorize the human errors appearing in each evolutive stage for each drinking water incident. Human 
errors identified here are based on factual evidence and all the information came from referenced traceable 
academic literature and authoritative official reports, which contribute to minimizing potential author bias. The 
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method used in this paper is not only to identify the causes of outbreaks, but highlights how human errors 
contribute to the amplification of the risks. The causes of drinking water incidents can be identified by other 
strategies such as Fault Tree Analysis, but the ordinary fault analysis techniques are not suitable to explain 
how a drinking water incident evolves into an influential public crisis. This paper pays attention to process 
analysis and try to demonstrate the role of human errors in crisis forming and risk control. So, the human error 
prevention perspective has not only technical significance but also social meaning and explicit policy 
relevance, as it contribute to precautions against the amplification of related risks. 
 
Table 1. Drinking water incident cases and human errors in the gestation for each drinking water incident 
No. 
Incident name; Place; 
Year 
Human error sketch 
1 Richmond Heights, 
Florida, USA, 1974 
A: Pumped unchlorinated raw water to the distribution system; Less 
consideration about pathogens; Failed to detect the invalidation of a booster 
pump; Distributed unchlorinated groundwater to the community without 
treatment barrier. 
B: Lack of threat awareness about water safety; Failed to collect bacterial 
monitoring data in January; Poor performance ability. 
E: Public health authorities became aware only near the end of the outbreak 
and this experience had been repeated often. 
2 Rome, New York, 
U.S.A., November 
1974-June 1975 
A: Insufficient drinking water filtration; failed to recognize the low level of 
chlorination. 
D: Ignorance of the warning inherent. 
3 Camas, Washington, 
U.S.A., April-May 
1976 
A: Poor operating practice; Errors in drinking water system design. 
B: No adequate monitoring program. 
4 Berlin, New 
Hampshire, USA, 
Mar–May 1977 
A: Filters shortage; Violated the health rules. 
5 Bennington, Vermont, 
USA, May 1978 




A: Chlorination is inadequate; Failed to set up adequate barriers. 
B: Did not recognize the vulnerability of surface water sources; Routine 
monitoring was not performed. 
C: Little information was reported. 
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7 Georgetown, Texas, 
USA, Jun 1980 
A: Insufficient filter operating practices; Inadequate water disposal systems. 
B: Lack of responsiveness from the water utility; Did not recognize the 
vulnerability of groundwater sources. 
C: Signals from original outbreak were not recognized. 
F: Lack of concern about groundwater sources. 
8 An outbreak of 
gastroenteritis at 
Rome, Northern 
Georgia, August 1980 
A: The irregularity of equipment renewal; Operation error; Coliform bacteria 
were not quantified. 
B: An association between illness and drinking water was not shown due to 
low educational background (Kaplan et al., 1982); Lack of monitoring. 
9 Eagle-Vail, Colorado, 
USA, Mar 1981 
A: Operations flaw; Failed to set up adequate barriers; Insufficiency of the 
filtration process; Unsafe maintenance work; Design errors. 
C: Failed to survey an alarm. 
10 Mjövik, Blekinge, 
Sweden, Oct 1982 
A: Inadequate flushing of the distribution system; Maintenance errors; Lack 
of knowledge about the drain and disinfection; Lack of understanding about 
system. 
11 Drumheller, Alberta, 
Canada, Feb 1983 
A: Coagulation treatment in winter led to the vulnerability of water system. 
B: Failed to perform routine monitoring; insufficient cooperation and 
communication among various related sectors.  
C: The notice of boil water advisory was late. 
E: Lack of prompt investigation and remedial action. 
12 Greenville, Florida, 
USA, May 1983 
A: Employed unlicensed workers; Unsafe acts from operators; Poor design of 
water treatment system. 
13 Braun Station, Texas, 
USA, May–Jul 1984 
A: Poorer design of the water system. 
B: Failed to monitor water source wells. 
F: Lack of summarization of the experience. 
14 Sälen, Dalarna, 
Sweden, Dec 1986–
Jan 1987 
A: Bad design of preventive backflow. 
D: Failed to take action to alarm signals. 
15 Outbreak of 
Cryptosporidium at 
Carrollton, Georgia, in 
U.S.A, 1987 
A: Poor treatment practices; Delayed renewal of filtration equipment. 
B: Malpractice of regulators; Poor design of the monitoring system. 
E: The threat posed by pathogens was not widely recognized immediately. 
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16 Sunbury, Diggers Rest 
and Bulla, Victoria, 
Australia, October 
1987 
A: Unstrained surface water was delivered to consumers; A false perspective 
on pathogens was hold for a long time; Water quality did not satisfy the 
standards. 
B: Poor communication; The relevant staff did not realize heavy rainfall 
would cause the outbreak. 
E: Lack of trust between the water authority and investigators. 
17 Cornish town Water 
Poisoning, Camelford, 
Britain, 1988 
A: 20 tons of aluminum sulfate was inadvertently dumped into the wrong tank 
by a relief driver who was not familiar with the plant’s layout and delivery 
measures (Winston and Leventhal, 2008). 
B: The driver was told to “tell no one” about the deleterious water (Cornish 
Guardian, 2010). The cause of the problem remained undetermined for two 
days (Winston and Leventhal, 2008).  
C: The authority provided false information and concealed the truth; For 
several days the water authority insisted the water was safe and revealed it 
in a tiny advertisement in the local paper (Reid, 2007). 
E: Lack of rigorous examination or monitoring of the health of victims; The 
long-term implications for those victims remained unclear (Hawkes, 2006).




A: Lack of necessary test; Did not recognize dejecta as a pollution source; 
Improper construction and maintenance; Failed to abide by regulations 
B: Did not document equipment replacement; Lack of regular system audits. 
C: Some failures were not notified timely by the system operator. 
19 Skjervøy, Norway, 
July-August 1988 
A: Unsafe acts; Lack of disinfection procedures. 
B: Failure to perform routine monitoring. 
20 Swindon, Oxfordshire 
and Wiltshire, 
England, 
Dec 1988–Apr 1989 
A: Poor operating practices.
B: Deficiency of monitoring program. 
C: Failed to make an explicit recommendation. 
21 Moama, New South 
Wales, Australia, 
Dec 1989–Jan 1990 
A: Maintenance error. 
22 Naas, Count Kildare, 
Ireland, Oct 1991 
A: Insufficient chlorination.
B: The water utility paid little attention to the initial complaint from 
consumer. 
23 Uggeløse, Denmark, 
Dec 1991–Jan 1992 
A: Design errors; Unsafe acts. 
C: Failed to signal warning timely when the survey result was negative. 
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24 Warrington, Cheshire, 
England, 
Nov 1992–Feb 1993 
B: Lack of routine monitoring; Failed to investigate the warning signals even 
when abnormal occurred. 
25 Outbreak of 
salmonellosis in 
Gideon, Missouri, in 
1993 
A: Unsafe act and misconduct; no adequate monitoring program; Sanitary 
violations; Poor maintenance. 
B: Water quality manager was short of knowledge about the system. 
C: Lack of enforcement; Boiling water notice was not delivered to all 
residents. 
F: No independent public inquiry was held; Absence of immediate record. 





A: Failed to keep favorable filtration operation; Insufficient monitoring for 
pathogens; Malpractice of regulators; Failed to abide by water quality 
standards and recognize Cryptosporidium outbreaks. 
B: Failed to respond to signals of consumer complaints; Lack of intensive 
efforts and cooperation between the medical community and those who 
provide and regulate drinking water (Mackenzie et al., 1994). 
F: True reason of water pollution had never been identified and unveiled by 
officials. 
(summarized from Eisenberg et al., 2005) 
27 Temagami, Ontario, 
Canada, Feb–May 
1994 
A: Poor operating ability and bad design of the water system; Poor waste 
management; Poor performance of water-treatment plants. 
28 Water contamination 
incident near 
Worcester, April 1994, 
UK 
A: Unsafe acts; Lack of knowledgeable operators; Lack of the superior 
filtration systems. 
B: Limitation in the scale of emergency; Failure to perform routine 
monitoring. 
C: The delay of issuing warning; Issued inconsistent advice and list. 
F: Short of cooperation and communication among related sectors. 
(summarized from Fowle et al., 1996) 
29 South Devon, 
England, Aug–Sep 
1995 
B: The operation of water treatment plant did not follow the recommendations 
of first Badenoch Inquiry Report; Poor operation in water treatment plant. 
30 Sydney Water Crisis, 
Australia, 1998 
B: Ignorance of low levels of Cryptosporidium and Giardia; Severe 
underestimation of the level of pathogen; Initial official inactivity. 
C: The official issued nothing to the public about contamination. Lack of 
appropriate contingency planning; The delay of announcing contamination.
D: Lack of effective education in improving compliance during boil water 
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orders; Issued three inconsistent boiled water notices that led to the distrust.
E: The water crisis management was improper. 
F: The removal performance of pathogens was not specified in any contracts. 
31 La Neuveville, Bern 
Canton, Switzerland, 
August 1998 
A: Design errors; The alarm for pump failure was shut off. 
B: Customers failed to report abnormalities; Lack of cooperation and 
communication between local physician and water utilities. 
F: Water agency did not attach importance to deal with water contamination. 
32 An outbreak of 
gastroenteritis at 
Resort Hotel in 
Bermuda, Feb 1998 
A: The water tank was not cleaned; Poor maintenance; Lack of 
communication between various parties; Unsafe maintenance; The system 
vulnerability was not recognized; Lack of operator training and 
management liability; Poor design in drainage system; Sanitary deficiencies 
of chlorinated water system. 
B: Lack of regular monitoring. 
F: Lack of an international guideline for the management of water incidents 
among tourists in holiday resorts (Jiménez et al., 2004). 




attendees of the 
Washington County 
Fair, New York, 1999 
A: Lack of flushing and disinfection program; Unsafe acts; Failed to 
recognize risk from septic seepage; No one realized that the extreme 
drought of previous summer might induce unsafe water; Narrowly relying 
on monitoring to assure safety. 
B: Inadequacy of intermittent microbiological monitoring of wells. 
34 Walkerton Ontario 
Canada, 2000 
A: Paid less attention to the protective advice for water source at installation
stage; Design errors; maintenance errors; Less training for frontline 
workers; Did not realize the extreme weather might affect water safety; 
Narrowly relying on monitoring as indicators to assure safety; Ignored 
warning signals of shallow well vulnerability. 
B: Regulator failed to meet regulations with continuous monitoring of 
chlorine residual to vulnerable shallow wells. 
C: Lack of procedures for giving out information; Manager fails to notify 
involved parties. 
E: The utility does not conduct on-the-spot investigations. 
F: The simplified reporting mechanism did not include the requirement of 
reporting adverse test results. 
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35 North Battleford, 
Canada, Mar–April 
2001 
A: Poor water treatment performance; Lack of competent foreman; Unsafe 
acts; Outdated technology; Limited operator training; Lack of real-time 
feedback in Info System; Lack of continuing education and training of 
operators; Lack of a network for sharing experience and learning from 
others; No reservoir for water treatment; Narrowly relying on monitoring as 
indicators to assure safety; Ignored warnings about vulnerability of shallow 
well. 
B: Inadequate supervision of waterworks; Negative respond to operator’s 
report. 
C: No further inspection after sensing abnormality. 
E: Ambiguous CDI guidance. 
36 Transtrand, Dalarna, 
Sweden, February- 
March 2002 
A: Lack of chlorination for drinking water supply. 
C: Boil water notice was issued late. 
D: Lack of effective response. 
(summarized from Carrique-Mas et al., 2003; Westrell et al., 2006) 




A: Unsafe acts; Maintenance error.
B: Concealed the truth; No communication between government and the 
public. 
C: Concealed the truth; Late warning; Delay in releasing the fact. 
E: Dissemination of pollution information by media was governed. 
F: Lack of the cooperation among the actors; Unclear of liability; Lack of an 
authoritative crisis management department. 
(summarized from Xinhua News Agency, 2005) 
38 Wuxi water crisis, 
Jiangsu, China, 2007 
A: Poor site selection of plant location; Extreme eutrophication and improper 
discharge of industrial and domestic wastewater. 
B: Failed to recognize extreme weather could cause water contamination. 
(summarized from Zhang et al., 2010) 
39 Shuyang 40 hours 
water crisis, Jiangsu 
Province, China, July 
2007  
A: Unsafe acts; Maintenance error. 
(summarized from Xinhua News Agency, 2007) 
40 Chifeng water 
pollution, Inner 
Mongolia, China, 
July- August 2009  
A: Lack of security safeguard; Unsafe performance acts. 
B: No aware of fecal contamination around the surface water; Lack of water 
plant experience; Negligence of related departments. 
C: Late notification; Delay in reporting water pollution. 
F: Late remedial measures; Underestimation of the water pollution 
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consequences; Lack of subsequent remedy. 
(summarized from Xinhua News Agency, 2009) 
 
Table 1 provides cases in which human error directly or indirectly contributes to drinking water incidents. 
These cases show that human error may occur in any period of a water incident gestation process. Table 2 
summarizes human errors in different periods of the gestation process with indication of corresponding case 
numbers. Figure 2 summarizes the accumulative number of human errors in Table 2 corresponding to each 
digestion period in Figure 1. 
 
Table 2. Summary of different types of human errors emerged in different digestion periods 
Human errors Corresponding period and serial number of cases  
Unsafe acts. A: 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 
35, 37, 38, 39, 40 
Design errors. A: 5, 9, 13, 14, 22, 23, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38 
B: 15 
Maintenance errors.  A: 1, 4, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39 
B: 18 
Poor operation skills.  A: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 20, 22, 27, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40 
Failed to recognize external changes that may cause 
water contamination.   
B: 1, 6, 7, 16, 18, 33, 34, 38, 40 
Failure to perform routine monitoring.  B: 1, 3, 6, 8, 11, 13, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33, 34, 35 
Failure to interpret monitoring results correctly. B: 8, 13, 30 
Failure to respond to reports of consumers or others.  B: 7, 22, 26, 29, 35,  
D: 2 
Warning signals are absent, inadequate, late, 
inconsistent or misdirecting.   
C: 6, 7, 9, 11, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 28, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40 
Failure to or inadequate respond to warnings.  D: 14, 30, 36 
Poor emergency response.  E: 11, 30, 34, 37 
F: 17, 25, 31, 32, 34, 37, 40 
Lack of communication or trust.  B: 11, 16, 26, 31, 37 
C: 30, 34 
E: 15, 16 
F: 28, 37 
Disguise, underestimate, denial or contempt. B: 17, 34, 37 
C: 17, 30, 37 
E: 1, 17, 30, 35, 37 





Figure 2. The accumulative number of human errors for each period (investigated from the 40 cases) 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that the contamination period has the most frequent occurrence of human errors and the 
sensing period is also significant. The occurrence of human errors in the other periods (warning, recognition, 
inspection and recovery) is less frequent but cannot be ignored. Consequently, we speculate that human errors 
contribute significantly to allowing a potential water hazard to evolve into a severe water incident, and it is 
therefore imperative to distinguish and further control human errors in the early stages of a drinking water 
incident. 
 
4. Results and analysis 
 
4.1. The distribution of the human errors in each period 
 






       
Contaminating Period                                                                   Sensing Period 
                                  
Warning Period                                                                         Recognition Period 
                                
Inspection Period                                                                     Recovery Period 
Figure 3. The distribution of the human errors in each period 
 
4.2. Commonalities and potential countermeasures in each period 
 
4.2.1. Contaminating period 
We categorize human errors in the contamination period fall into four types: unsafe acts, design errors, 
maintenance errors and poor operational skills. These errors are mostly related to the behavior of operators and 
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managers. Organizations in case studies 2, 8, and 9 lacked safety rules and operating procedures. Frontline 
workers in cases 1, 16 and 34 were remiss in their work and malpractice resulted in drinking water incidents. 
For these situations, standard operating procedures (SOP) must be reinforced and effectively implemented. A 
SOP is a set of written documents or instructions detailing all necessary steps of a routine or repetitive activity 
which should be followed by an organization (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2007). SOPs 
are important to drinking water management and can facilitate consistent service quality. SOPs recount the 
regular performance processes implemented or followed in a drinking water supply system, and include 
procedures that can be performed to promote consistency of technical and quality requests for drinking water 
supply. In addition, SOPs involve fundamental performance actions and technical-related operations. However, 
SOPs must be followed strictly and SOPs must also be continuously improved based on experience. Learning 
from the past is an essential and effective way for building resilience to secure safe drinking water. For poor 
operational skills, a preferred way is to employ well-educated operators. If this cannot be achieved, sufficient 
in-house training must be provided by drinking water utilities and its effectiveness must be evaluated. 
 
4.2.2. Sensing period 
Human errors are colorful in terms of various types in the sensing period. The sensing period is critical 
because early detection of contamination offers a chance for rapid and effective emergency response. It is a 
critical period for demonstrating resilience. Failure to perform routine monitoring effectively is the principal 
human error in this period. Incentives are needed to promote safety consciousness among operators and 
monitoring personnel. Rigorous penalty clauses in addition to specific rewards are necessary to guarantee 
effective current monitoring. Inexperience or lack of concern will naturally lead to a “failure to interpret 
monitoring results correctly”. A related human error is a failure “to recognize external changes that may cause 
water contamination”. This may be caused by external uncertainties about threats to the safety of drinking 
water and/or workers’ lack of attention, care or devotion to their work. Therefore, training, education and 
incentives for good performance are essential. Likewise, financial support and managers’ commitment must be 
sufficient to build efficient reporting and communication channels for rapid recognition of drinking water 
abnormalities. The “failure to respond to reports of consumers or others” and “lack of communication” also 
constitute a large part of human error in this period of the evolution of incidents. 
 
4.2.3. Warning period 
Rapid and efficient warning is essential for preventing a water crisis and minimizing the potential losses. 
Any obstacle that leads to insufficient or inefficient warning may allow consequences to escalate. In the 
warning period, water companies examined in these studies often failed to provide timely and reliable warning 
information, where missing is an important factor contributing to the deterioration of the situation. In fact, all 
of the human errors found in the warning period showed that warning signals were not properly delivered to 
the consumers. The reasons were diverse, but the common theme was the need to advise consumers as 
accurately and as soon as possible about what consumers can and should do. A functional and collaborative 
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relationship with the relevant public health agency should be a high priority for a water provider (Jalba et al., 
2010).  
 
4.2.4. Recognition period 
Human errors in the recognition period were comparatively rare. Only 4 out of the total of 40 cases exhibit 
human errors in this period. But the role of this period should not be neglected. Extensive and clear notices are 
necessary to make consumers recognize what is wrong with the tap water and how to cope with the difficult 
period when safe drinking water is not provided. Most strategies in the recognition period aim to reduce the 
impacts of the drinking water incident and minimize adverse consequences. Techniques like an official email 
notice and/or Short Message Service (SMS) will help the public to understand the emergency situation quickly. 
Further information and progress may properly be provided by local radio, TV and online news. 
 
4.2.5. Inspection period and recovery period 
The inspection period and recovery period exhibit similar types of human errors. “Poor emergency 
response” is typical in the above two periods. Collaboration of different departments, cultivation of emergency 
leadership and learning from past incidents are important to enhance the emergency response ability (Jalba et 
al., 2010). From the case studies, deficiencies revealed by “lack of communication or trust” and “conceal the 
fact or tell lies” are likely to arise in various stages of different drinking water incidents. These errors must be 




There are some commonalities among the drinking water incidents we analyzed. For example, early 
identification and swift response in these cases were frequently absent; frontline workers lacked a sense of 
responsibility and were inadequately trained; and consumers, as the front line for sensing abnormalities, 
lacked an effective channel for reporting, complaining and communication about their detection of drinking 
water contamination. This deficiency leads to delays in taking countermeasures to control contamination and 
results in risk amplification to cause a water crisis with even greater negative social impacts. 
Early identification of hazards is important to prevent and control water incidents, and this rests with the 
persistence and maintenance of a culture of trust, integrity, cooperation and open communication between 
users and providers of drinking water. If an error is made and recognized, initiatively admitting and quickly 
reporting it to an appropriate supervisor will be the right thing. In contrast, hiding or ignoring errors is likely 
to lead to serious consequences (Johnstone and Kanitsaki, 2006). An effective system will allow operational 
personnel to recognize when they are facing a situation which may exceed their capacity to respond effectively 
and encourage them to seek assistance in dealing with the problem. 
Given the need for coping with human errors to secure safe drinking water, the following discusses 
approaches and tools to achieve resilience by considering three groups: consumers, drinking water companies, 
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and policy regulators. This analysis involves concepts and ideas from behavioral science, organizational 
culture, and incentive analysis. The following will clarify this step by step. 
 
5.1. Seeking resilience through active consumer complain channels 
 
Consumers are in the frontline of using tap water and this position provides them the chance to discover 
abnormal taste in drinking water. It is essential for the warning alarms signaled by consumers to be effectively 
heard by the water supply company. Paying more attention to complaints from consumers can be helpful for 
improving management, maintenance and monitoring of drinking water quality (Montenegro et al., 2009). But 
we should also notice, as da Silva et al. (2010) highlighted, that assuring citizen rights and company 
obligations in monitoring drinking water safety and reporting abnormality is hindered by poor channels of 
communication. Meyer-Emerick (2004) believed that the communication supported by the Consumer 
Confidence Reports (CCRs) was one-way, and water companies should communicate with their consumers 
routinely in a two-way dialog capable of listening to the questions and concerns of consumers. Perceptions of 
taste and odour problems should be recognized as a critical issue. But historically, drinking water providers 
seldom set a high priority on facilitating users’ communication with them. 
A key factor for building resilience mechanisms to cope with human error in drinking water systems is 
assuring a swift response to customer complaints, which is efficient for recovery from a specific or immediate 
malfunction and helpful for the quick identification of human error to reduce the likelihood of a serious water 
incident. Resilience mechanisms should include facilitation of consumer complaints, the ability to respond to 
complaints in a timely manner, and the ability to quickly recover from incidents. But most consumers who 
complained tend to transfer information informally only to frontline operators, neighbors, anyone easy to 
access, rather than to responsible authorities. Central in this regard are findings by the Technical Assistance 
Research Programs that show a “tip of the iceberg” phenomenon for complaints (Goodman, 1999). In 
particular, across incidents, of those who had reasons for complaint, only about 1% to 5% complained to 
principal managers; about 45% complained to frontline operators, though such complaints seldom reached 
principal managers; and about 50% who encountered negative events never complained (Luria et al., 2009). 
This phenomenon is understandable because customers wish to quickly address their immediate concerns and 
are intended in obtaining a swift response (Bettencourt and Brown, 2003). Informal complaints from 
consumers may obtain a quick answer only if frontline operators are appropriately empowered, well educated, 
trained and supported (Homburg and Fürst 2005). Unfortunately, informal complaints are less likely to be 
heard by the right managers unless frontline operators are motivated to report them upwards or consult with 
immediate supervisors about how to deal with them (Luria et al., 2009). It is thus essential to encourage 
consumers and frontline operators to report abnormality, and make quick responses to emerging problems. 
This motivation requires cultivation of a safety culture. 
 




The concept of “safety culture”, usually referred to as safety knowledge or safety consciousness formed in 
social practice, was put forward by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG, 1986). It differs 
from the common “culture” concept. 
Safety culture for a water utility might involve two aspects. (1) It is embedded in organizational attitudes 
and values, reflecting a common sense of a drinking water supply enterprise and its employees about the 
importance of safety and security. It requires staff to put safety above all else in their work, especially when 
the economic benefits and security considerations are in conflict, to ensure the safe drinking water prevails. (2) 
It is also related to personal attitude, which reflects personal awareness of security-related institutions, 
measures and behaviors and personal feelings about security. The key points of building safety culture lie in: 
the philosophy of safety first, recognition that everyone is a barrier to preventing a water incident, a high 
degree of transparency, and a culture promoting feedback from experience which also actively encourages 
discovery of problems. In the process of cultivating a safety culture, the following key measures are suggested: 
 Establish a sound security management unit inside the drinking water agency that will develop internal 
security policies, objectives, regulations and quality management procedures. 
 Develop a quantitative evaluation index system for safety culture based on a Management by Objectives 
(MBO) approach, with reference to the practice of the agency itself. 
 Ensure that managers set a consistently good example for the sake of safety management. 
 Enhance training and improve technical skills and awareness of safety culture among first-line operators, 
and at the same time, establish strict safety standards for critical actions and procedures. 
 Trace the root causes of past incidents and learn from past events. 
 Build an ongoing self-assessment system for safety culture and improve it continually. 
 Create and maintain a healthy atmosphere for receiving customers’ opinions through extensive publicity 
of safety culture. 
Safety culture needs to be an important element of modern management of drinking water supply 
enterprises. This culture will establish a set of scientific and strict rules and regulations, cultivate staff security 
consciousness and good working habits, and create an atmosphere whereby everyone is concerned about the 
drinking water safety. Safety culture plays an important active role in reducing human errors and raising the 
level of overall security and is an effective contribution towards building resilience. 
The foregoing proposals about cultivating safety culture are based on the assumption that a drinking water 
supply corporation has active motivation, strong will and thorough determination to put drinking water safety 
above all other considerations. However, many water supply corporations may fail to create safety culture for 
different reasons. Therefore, it is better to introduce an incentive compatibility mechanism (Miao et al., 2010) 
to direct the behaviors of local government, water supply agencies and employees to force implementation of 
thorough supervision of drinking water by forming multi-level restrictions, rewards and disciplinary rules. But 
the local government should not confine its role in setting rules. It should commit itself to create a risk control 
oriented institutional culture and to provide all the possible support to facilitate the achievement of this 
18 
 
ambition (Labodova, 2004). In this manner, resilience can be built effectively and problems can be brought to 
the surface and solved to their root causes, providing a feasible and efficient way for securing safe drinking 
water. 
 
5.3. Developing resilience through collaboration 
 
Table 3 characterizes the strategies that have a high probability of developing resilience through 
collaboration to cope with human errors and potential risks in drinking water systems. 
 
Table 3. Strategies for developing resilience through collaboration to cope with human errors 
Strategies Features and Functions
Communication By communicating the abnormality of drinking water quality among various parties, 
an effective and immediate response may be performed. The communication, as 
mentioned above, is critical in understanding actual local impacts and adaptations and 
has high probability for reducing or reversing adverse consequences (Berkes, 2007). 
Learning Frontline operators, immediate managers, supervisors, water utilities and government 
agencies should learn from past drinking water events. If do not learn or summarize 
the experience and lessons from past incidents, it is possible that the disaster will 
repeat again. On the contrary, there will be an opportunity to get a clear understanding 
of the situation. Drinking water utilities have the opportunity to create learning 
networks across stakeholders such as policy-makers, supervisors, operators, local 
physicians and consumers (Ullsten et al., 2004). 
Inter-organization 
cooperation 
A treaty of collaboration among related departments should be reached (such as a 
treaty between local physician and water company). This can further strengthen 
organizational incentive effect and enhance response speed in coping with drinking 
water incidents and reducing the severity of an incident. 
Information platform 




After recognizing the abnormality of drinking water, Information platform facilitated 
by ICT provides an efficient platform to promote communication among the front-line 
operators, local physicians, municipal governors and the relevant water utility 
departments. This can greatly simplify the procedure of abnormality report process 
and enhance the speed of emergency response. 
 
With the adoption of the recommended strategies, human errors and potential risks in drinking water system 
may be dramatically reduced. It should be noted that the feasibility of these strategies should be guaranteed by 
designing incentive compatibility mechanisms (Miao et al., 2010) to drive the collaboration of related actors 
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(Zeng et al., 2011). Furthermore, various tactics can be further developed to make these strategies suitable for 
concrete scenarios. 
 
5.4. Enhancing resilience through preventive risk management tools 
 
Preventive risk management has tools based on resilience philosophy. For example, we list two: 
 Critical Control Points (CCPs). CCPs are critical for ensuring safe drinking water safety from source 
contamination to distribution. CCPs can be developed by obtaining thorough understanding of the 
drinking water treatment processes. Knowledge management, expert insight and experience, and staff 
training need to safeguard CCPs. Ongoing, thorough inspection is necessary to detect all the relevant 
hazards that may threaten CCPs, and this compromise preventative risk management. 
 SOPs. These are vital for preventing human errors. SOPs contribute to confirming the desired workflow 
and avoiding possible trouble that may lead to avoidable risks. Human reliability analysis designs a 
process that is easy for personnel to do the right thing and hard to do the wrong thing (Boston-
Fleischhauer, 2008) making SOPs imperative for enhancing human reliability and reducing human errors. 
 
Although the issue of safe drinking water has been given increasing attention and is perceived to be 
desirable by society, achievement of the safety goal is very difficult. Overcoming the challenge of human 
errors calls for culture-related organizational change, which is critical for embedding resilience into drinking 
water risk management. However, organizational culture is implicitly woven into everyday corporate practice, 
and is extremely difficult to be changed at its root. This challenge poses an agenda for further exploration. For 
instance, identifying and understanding an agency’s existing safety culture will reveal fields that need change; 
distinguish and cultivate the appropriate leadership style in water risk management to promote culture change 
(Summerill et al., 2010); discover communication barriers and build efficient reporting channels for abnormal 
conditions; find ways to improve team cohesiveness and staff motivation; enhance organizational learning and 
flexibility. Besides, detailed comparative case study may be further developed to analyze the difference in risk 




This paper finds that human error is a major contributor to risk amplification of drinking water incidents. 
Understanding and taking actions to prevent human errors across the lifecycle of drinking water incidents 
closely relates to the concept of resilience in drinking water risk management. In view of many potential 
causes of drinking water incidents, resilience makes a useful intellectual and policy contribution to find means 
to cope with the situations under which drinking water incidents might happen. It will not be possible to 
remove all potential factors and conditions that may allow human error, and no water agency can guarantee 
that breakdowns will not occur. However, management of human error is a comprehensive process involving 
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prevention, planning, acute response, recovery and learning. All of these procedures involve resilience, a 
beneficial insight about drinking water safety that shifts from a traditional human reliability perspective to 
viewing organization as a defense against failure. Translating the resilience concept into practice requires 
identifying and testing mechanisms for constructing resilience within complex process reengineering. This 
study suggests that an effective and immediate response during the immediate aftermath (the first hours and 
days) critically relies on the resilience developed with consumers, first-line responders, water supply agency 
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